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McGraw: Automobile Insurance Rates

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATES:
PROMULGATION, REGULATION,
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION

T

HE INTEREST in the price one pays for automobile insurance continues
to grow at a rapid pace. The reason for this growing consumer interest
may be attributed to the equally increasing need for automobiles, the price
paid for them, and consequently, the need for insurance protection. This
insurance protection has developed into a matter of major economic
consequence to the auto owner. It has evolved from a type of luxury into
a necessity for most. With all due respect to the insurance industry and
their justified motive of making money, the auto owner is dependent on
the product of the industry. Although most states do not statutorily
require all drivers to have insurance, insurance is accepted, not as an
option, but as an integral part of the automobile or the operator's license.
An uninsured automobile driver is by far the exception and not the rule.
Accordingly, the interest of the policyholder in the cost he must pay
for his various insurance coverages is manifested in rate regulation. It is
this regulation or the ability to control automobile insurance rates which
is the primary concern of this comment. Traditionally, regulation has
been effectuated through state legislation, state insurance departments,
and the insurance industry itself. Whether the legislators, the insurance
commissioners, or the insurance companies themselves sufficiently protect
the interests of the insured is here in question. A brief discussion of the
background of insurance regulation is followed by a criticism of the basic
statutory law for promulgation and regulation of automobile rates.
The key to improved and efficient rate-watching is in the good faith
efforts and perseverance of the policyholders themselves. Accordingly, an
examination of the effects of consumerism along with a discussion of
modern rate and regulatory developments is offered to show the present
relationships and interactions of the groups involved.
In addition to controlling insurance rates via the traditional channels,
there is also a fundamental and feasible consideration which can be

effectively implemented into rate promulgation and regulation. This
consideration is a constitutional one, and its proposal is the major impetus
of this comment: that certain classifications comprising auto rates may

be in violation of equal protection standards.
The following discussions and arguments are leveled at the insurance
rates and surrounding controls in Ohio only because it is a convenient
example. The condition of rates and their related problems in Ohio is

fairly representative of the situation in most states.
[225]
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THE BACKGROUND OF REGULATION
From 1868 to 1944 it was generally believed that insurance was not
commerce and was therefore immune from federal regulation.' While
the attempts to legislate federal control were generally unsuccessful,
detailed laws were enacted in every state in the 1800's and early 1900's
to protect the public from various problems and practices of insurance
companies. Regulation of insurance rates did not begin until 1909 when
Kansas adopted the first rate regulatory law affecting property and
casualty insurance. But it was not until 1914 that the states first found
themselves clearly possessed with the power to control rates. In 1914 the
Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins. v. Lewis2 held that insurance
was a "business affected with a public interest," thereby giving the states
regulatory power over insurance rates. Thereafter, every state sought
to regulate rates.
The first Ohio legislation regarding insurance rate regulation came
in 1917 as a result of a legislative committee study. This legislation
required all fire insurance companies to become members of rating
bureaus 3 whose rates were to be filed with the Superintendent of
Insurance if he so requested. The primary purpose of this legislation was
to regulate price competition among the companies and keep them from
driving their own rates to uneconomical levels. This mandatory bureau
scheme remained in effect until the mid 1940's when the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Assn. 4 held
that intrastate activities of insurance companies constituted interstate
commerce and were therefore subject to federal control under the
Commerce Clause of Art. I sec. 85 of the United States Constitution. As
a direct result of the decision, the McCarren-Ferguson Act 6 was enacted
in 1945, restoring to the states the power to regulate insurance. The
McCarren Act was a compromise between the Congressional advocates

'Paul

v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
2 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
3 107 Omo LAws 743-747 (1917), repealed in 1947.
4 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964). § 1012 provides:
(a) The business of insurance.., shall be subject to the laws of the several
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.... Provided: That after June 30, 1948 ... the Sherman Act... the

Clayton Act, and ... the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law.
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of complete exemption from the Sherman Anti-Trust laws and the
supporters of heavy surveillance by the federal government. 7
The state commissioners of insurance, aided by the insurance
companies, prepared model bills for regulating rate making for submission
8
to state legislatures. Most of the states adopted such "all-industry" bills,
being motivated by various factors involving improving the quality and
scope of state regulation of rates, the desire to enable insurance companies
to escape the provisions of federal statutes, and the desire to maintain
9
intact state control and taxation of the insurance industry. Ohio adopted
0
for life insurance and the file and use
the all-industry approach'
approach" for previously unregulated casualty insurance. Ohio has
undergone nebulous change in its rate regulation since the adoption
of these laws in 1947.
LEGISLATION FOR PROMULGATION AND REGULATION
Under the Ohio laws, 12 rates must be based on loss experience,
physical hazards, a reasonable margin for profit, and other relevant
factors. A particular insurer may file directly with the Department
of Insurance or indirectly through a rate bureau licensed by the
Department. 13 The rates, 14 themselves, originate in the bureaus or in
advisory organizations. Besides establishing rates, the rating bureaus have
a further profound effect on the industry by promulgating underwriting
rules, policy forms, and conducting loss-prevention inspections. In
addition to rate bureaus, advisory organizations play a major role in rate
competition. The Ohio Revised Code defines advisory organizations as,
"[E]very group, association, or other organization of insurers.., which
assists insurers... in rate making, by the collection and furnishing of

REP. No. 20, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. p. 41 (1945); See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec. 1087 (1945); 90 Cong. Rec.
6532 (1944).
8 See Rose, State Regulation of Property and Casualty Insurance Rates, 28 O.S.L.J.
669, 696 (1967).
9 S. KIMBALL, ESSAYS IN INSURANCE REGULATION 29, 30 (1966).
10 Under the all-industry laws, proposed rates must be filed with the insurance
commissioner prior to use. Actual approval of rate filings is not required because
7 For a discussion of motivating factors behind the Act see S.

rates are deemed approved if not disapproved within a given number of days.
1 Under file and use, rates and supporting materials must be filed for informational
purposes with the appropriate state regulatory agency. Rates become effective upon
filing or at a later date specified in the filing.
12 OHIo REv. CoDE §§ 3935.03, 3937.02 (Page 1971).
13Omo REv. CODE §§ 3935.04(B), 3937.03(B) (Page 1971).
14 "Premium" and "rate" are commonly used interchangeably. Technically, the "rate"
is the cost of insurance per unit; used as a means or base for the determination of
premiums. "Premium" is the total of the "rates" for all the units in a given policy.
M. LEvy, A HANDBOOK OF PERSONNEL INSURANCE TERMINOLOGY 421, 453 (1968).
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loss or expense statistics or by the submission of recommendations, but
which do not make filings .... 15
Such groups must operate pursuant to other provisions of rate regulatory statutes. Neither the rate bureaus nor the advisory organizations
are governmental bodies, however the Ohio Department of Insurance has
16
express statutory authority to investigate the operations of both.
The Ohio Revised Code is anything but specific as to the standards
to be used in rate composition. Section 3937.02 (D) states that casualty
rates may not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." The
precise interpretation of these terms is not found in the Code and their
regulatory scope has been narrowed appreciably so that one may say
these legislative goals are reasonableness, adequacy and equity, terms that
mean nothing more than expressions of generally perceived concepts
concerning insurance.' 7 By way of superficial application, the principal
cause for the erosion of the three statutory terms of art involves poor
promulgation by the legislature only paying lip service to the idea of strict
regulation of insurance rates. Nevertheless, the duty of the Department of
Insurance remains the enforcement of the three regulatory terms of art.
Unfortunately the failure of the Ohio Revised Code to set guidelines
which may be referred to in order to construe the words "excessive,"
"inadequate," and "unfairly discriminatory" has resulted in allowing
insurance companies much freedom in affecting the economic priorities
of the consumer. Clearly then, the key to regulation of casualty rates by
the Ohio Department of Insurance is their enforcement of Code section
3937.02 (D). Enforcement, of course, directly depends on interpretation.
What are the theories and considerations behind the department's
interpretation of section 3937.02 (D)? What can the legislature do to
make this interpretation more consistent with the goals of the statutes in
protecting the public welfare as opposed to merely the industry's welfare?
Can the insurance consumer take any measures to promote affordable
protection or will his pleas be ignored by the insurance machine?
In general, rate excessiveness has been determined by setting a goal of
rate reasonableness. The idea of "reasonablenss" seems to have originated
with United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. and P. R.R.' 8 in which the Court
said: "On its face the provision that rates shall not be excessive ...
appears to establish a zone of reasonableness between the maxima and

15 OHio REv. CODE §§ 3935.12(A), 3937.09(A) (Page 1971).

16 OHio REv. CODE §§ 3935.11, 3935.12, 3937.11 (Page 1971).
17 Rose, Regulation of Property and gasualty Insurance Rates in Ohio, 32 O.S.L.J.
487, 498 (1971).
18 United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 506 (1935).
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minima within which a carrier is free to fix its charges." It would seem
that rate reasonability should be a combination of reasonable profits after
expenses to the insurers and economic feasibility to the policyholders.
In defining "excessive," however, the Ohio Department of Insurance
has looked to the level of underwriting profits for each company involved
in a particular rate filing. If the rate will provide an underwriting return
or profit above a certain target level, which depends on that company's
past underwriting returns, the rate is characterized as excessive. 19 Under
this method, what is excessive for one company may not be for another,
regardless of the fact that it is excessive to the insured.
Just how much the insurance department has ignored the customer
historically in determining what rates are "excessive" is open for
argument. Notwithstanding the past, the efforts of consumerism are
causing economic feasibility to become at least a consideration in rate
nonexcessiveness. The concept of economic affordability rests on the
concept that insurance, in this case automobile insurance, is such a vital
ingredient for the effective functioning of the economy and the social
2
system that no one should be denied it. 0
The best way to determine what is "excessive" should not depend
solely on how hard different pressure groups ride the back of the
insurance commissioner. Express statutory definitions accounting for
the interests of all parties should be promulgated. The test used in
Indiana 2 and several other states 22 is a step in this direction. These laws
provide: "No rate shall be excessive unless such rate is unreasonably high
for the insurance coverage provided and a reasonable degree of competition does not exist in the area with respect to the classification to which
the rate is applicable."
Not unlike excessiveness, "inadequacy" has been determined by
focusing on the level of underwriting profits. Rates must be adequate not
only to generate an insurance fund sufficient for paying legitimate claims
and related expenses, but also to offset the drain on surplus resulting
from an increasing number of policyholders, to provide for expanded
contingency reserves, and to provide stock insurers a means to assure
a return to investors.23 The need for rate adequacy was inspired by many
company insolvencies in the 1800's. These company failures were caused
by high competition for customer business in which the insurers merely

19

Rose, supra note 17 at 502.

2

OSee, e.g., In re Filing Made by N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 165 S.E.2d 207, 219
(N.C. Sup. Ct. 1969).
21 IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5341(4) (Bums Supp. 1972).
22
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1852(a) (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-507(a)
(Supp. 1972).
2 Rose, supra note 17 at 500.
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priced themselves out of existence. Today, however, insolvencies result
from factors other than inadequate rates, such as inept internal management, and consequently the adequacy standard takes a third place in
importance to "excessiveness" and "unfair discrimination." Notwithstanding its diminished priority, a statutory test for rate adequacy offers the best
method for uniform application of the insurance department's duties.
Such a desirable statute provides:
No rate shall be held to be inadequate unless such rate is unreasonably low for the insurance coverage provided and is insufficient
to sustain projected losses and expenses; or unless such rate is
unreasonably low for the insurance coverage provided and the use
of such rate has, or if continued, will
have, the effect of destroying
24
competition or creating a monopoly.
It seems that "unfair discrimination," even in absence of a statutory
definition, has created few problems. Generally it has meant that subject
to practical limitations, rates for various classes must be proportional to
expected claims or losses and expenses attributable to each class of
insurance. 25 So as long as each homogeneous group of policyholders pays
its proportionate share to cover the insured's loss ratio in that group,
the rates are considered equitable. Although this concept of equity has
met little opposition in the past, it makes discrimination possible unless
the groups and classifications of policyholders are regulated. In other
words, the greater the number of groups or classifications, the greater
the possibility that distinctions will arise which reflect social inequalities
which in turn result in inequitable rates. To most, it is readily understandable why insurers charge a higher premium to cover the reckless driver
with several past accidents. But from an equitable viewpoint it is difficult
to understand why individuals should be required to pay higher rates than
others owing to factors over which they have no control, such as race,
sex, or geographical location. It is these types of classifications which
may be discriminatory. While there is apparently an absence of substantial
public interest in this social equity, this does not mean the discrimination
does not exist. Whether or not there is a Constitutional violation involved
will be examined later.
EFFECTS OF CONSUMERISM
It is becoming clearer every day that the insurance industry must be
more cognizant of the customers' needs and wants. The consumer is
entitled to understandable product and service information.25 If the

24 IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5241(4)

(Bums Supp. 1972).

25 Osno REv. CODE § § 3935.09, 3937.08 proscribe misclassifications by implication.
26

Contra, THE NATIONAL UNDERwrrER, Dec. 22, 1972, at I (property and casualty

ins. ed.).
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consumer is denied a satisfactory voice in the industry's programs or at
least an easy access to corrective action, he will surely turn toward the
lawmakers for redress of his grievances. Perhaps the perfect example
of lawmakers heeding to consumerism is the no-fault concept of liability
insurance.27 The goal of the consumer is affordable insurance protection.
Just how to affect the price of insurance in a just way, balancing his goal
with that of the industry for competition, is the problem he faces. Direct
contact with the insurance industry, tougher regulation by the Department
of Insurance and lastly, new legislation are the three avenues open to
the reform of the present situation.
Modern consumerism, a broad-based and diverse movement to
improve the quality of goods, is an outgrowth of the affluent, highly
28
organized movement presently under the leadership of Ralph Nader.
Consumerism's biggest achievement in the insurance industry has been to
plant firmly in the minds of the public and politicians the idea that every
person has the right to buy insurance at an affordable price, thus
overturning the basic principles of risk and rating which have existed for
centuries. These principles have centered in the past, not around
affordability, but around loss experience. Other consumerism interests
have involved such things as credit reports, auto insurance systems, health
29
care and financing, and safety in many forms.
A regulatory product of the Ralph Nader effort is the belief that
insurance commissioners wear two hats with respect to the consumer.
They represent a general "public interest" which is a reconciliation of
the conflicting interests of insurers, insureds, and citizens indirectly
affected by the action or inaction of the industry and the insurance
departments. These third parties include the victims of unsafe products,
purchasers of products and services who might bear the cost of loss or of
insurance against loss, stockholders and investors, product design experts,
academicians, and insurance company employees and agents.
Thus commissioners have the double duty of adjudicating disputes
between particular interests or individuals and of seeing to it that interests
that if they are not
otherwise unrepresented be heard and considered, and
30
formally heard, that they nevertheless be considered.
It is conceded by many industry officials and regulators that
consumer interests have become a major factor in rate making or rate

27 A currently successful state no-fault law is Mass. Stat. 1970, ch. 670. For a

disfavorable opinion of federal no-fault insurance see Smith, Federal Automobile
Insurance, The Defense Bar's Position, 38 INs. COUNS. J. 413 (1971).
28 THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Dec. 15, 1972, Part I, at 1 (property and casualty

ins. ed.).
29 Id. at 34.
30 Tna NATIONAL UNDERWRrrER, Sept. 22, 1972, at 41 (property and casualty ins. ed.).
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regulation. But pragmatically speaking, little attention has been given to
the insured's need for a voice in these matters. This neglected goal of rate
regulation can be approached by educating the consumer on the
rate-making and rate regulatory processes and by providing him with
effective ways of expressing his views or obtaining relief.
Most individuals know little about the insurance enterprise and are
undoubtedly intimidated by the complexity of its product. Their lack of
knowledge has resulted in animosity toward companies and agents
alike. Neither the insurance department nor insurers provide the public
with information about the types of insurers offering coverage, the kinds
and costs of available coverage, the rights of policyholders under the
rate regulatory statutes, or the activities and services of the department.3 '
If the public could understand auto insurance and its inherent rating
system, the high wall of distrust would be lowered considerably. The
query then is how should insureds become informed?
The information insureds do receive concerning the auto insurance
industry is mainly in the form of sales advertising. Arguably, this type of
"education" can itself be seen as opposed to the public interest. 32 But on
the other hand, maybe some of the need for restrictive legislation and administrative regulation could 'be alleviated by the industry itself, by means
of an open and honest communication program which justifies the policyholder's related coverages in straight-forward, non-technical language.33
Realistically, the better view appears to be that the insurance
companies cannot be relied upon to inform the public due to their past
performance. The insurance department, acting as an instructor, would
discover a much more receptive audience. Several possibilities for
information dissemination by the Ohio Department of Insurance have
been proposed. One is the conducting of public hearings on major
bureau, deviation, and independent rate filings. Another, perhaps more
34
effective method, is a consumer information program.
Once the consumer knows some of the principles which compose
and control his auto insurance premium he is in a much better position
to express his views and claims to the insurance department when given
the opportunity to do so. One such vehicle used for expression of
consumer interests is insurance department advisory committees formed
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 121.13. 35
Rose, supra note 17, at 514, 515.
Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insurance and Tort Process in the
Personal Injury Claims System, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 703 (1969).
33 THE NATiONAL UNDERWRITER, Dec. 1, 1972, at 6 (property and casualty ins. ed.).
34 Rose, supra note 17, at 515.
35 OHio REV. CODE § 121.13 authorizes departmental directors, subject to the
approval of the governor, to appoint advisory groups to aid them in conducting
their work.
31

32
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On the national level, in September of 1972, Ralph Nader and
Peter J. Patkas, on behalf of the Corporate Accountability Research
Group, introduced eight specific proposals for expanded and more
meaningful participation by consumers and consumer spokesmen in
the affairs of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC). These proposals include:
* Inclusion of consumer advocates on NAIC advisory committees;
* Appointment by NAIC of a consumer affairs officer;
*.Publication of citizens' handbooks on the industry's regulation;
e Sponsorship of a monthly or quarterly consumer newsletter
highlighting regulatory developments of interest to the
36
public.
Finally, protection of the insureds' interests and rights may be
37
advanced by way of class actions. Class actions for insureds is a recent
development which has been greatly enhanced by Rule 23 of Ohio's new
Rules of Civil Procedure effective July 1, 1970. In regards to the
constitutional attack proposed inIra on the present composition of
of auto insureds in
insurance rates in Ohio, a class action on behalf
38
a particular classification would be appropriate.
RATING AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
In April 1971 the industry formed the Insurance Service Office from
six smaller rating bureaus. The ISO at that time jointly set and filed
standard rates for all but five of the major auto insurers.
As discussed earlier, the Department of Insurance does not compose
the auto rates itself. The rates are submitted to them and they then
determine whether or not the new rate(s) comply with the requirements
of Ohio Revised Code section 3937.02 (D). But in recent years "openrating" has been introduced in Ohio and a few other states to promote
competition. "Open-rating" generally allows companies to change rates
before notifying insurance authorities. While the Department of Insurance
may still strike down the rate change, its approval is not required for the
new rates to take effect. The Insurance Services Office is now promoting
the success of "open-rating" by making sure that company personnel do
39
not participate in the rate-making process for rates promulgated by them.
38 For a complete enumeration of the eight proposals see THE NATIONAL UNDER-

warrais, Sept. 16, 1972, at 1 (life and health ins. ed.).
37 See generally Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 1: Consideration of Equity,
49 B. U. L. REv. 211 (1969); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B. U. L. REv. 407 (1969).
38 Id. Part IHat 496.
39 The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 1972, at 3 col. 2. Contra, THE NATIONAL
UNDEawurrEa, Dec. 15, 1972, Part I, at 3 (property and casualty ins. ed.).
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The latest trend in rate-making is for auto insurers to phase out
jointly setting standard insurance rates in an effort to further increase
price competition. The effect is lower rates for the customer 4 and the
Insurance Service Office taking on more of an advisory capacity. The
rate cuts have been made possible by a surge in profits, accompanied by
anticipated loss reductions from 1973 model automobiles. 41 Although
everyone is naturally in favor of lowering auto insurance premiums, the
Department of Insurance will have to keep a close watch on insurers,
curbing their zest for volume with the reminder of their huge underwriting
losses of the 1960's.42
At the other end of the scale, not all attempted revisions of auto
rates in Ohio have been in the consumer's favor, nor have they all been
approved by the insurance commissioner. Included in the proposed
revision of rates, most of which became effective January 1, 1973,43 was
a provision assigning for the first time separate rates to Ohio Territories
11, 12, and 13.44 As a result, Territory 11 showed an increase in every
coverage category. The reason for the increase may be categorized as
higher losses in an underprivileged neighborhood. Fortunately the
commissioner found the increase inordinate, held that it could well
indicate excessiveness or unfair discrimination or both in the rating
application and/or process, and ordered that Territories 1.1, 12, and 13
continue to be combined for rate-making purposes. 45 The overall effect of

40 On Nov. 9 and 10, 1972, the Insurance Services Office of Ohio and the Ohio
Bureau of Casualty Insurers respectively, made revision filings with the Ohio Dept of
Insurance under Ohio Rev. Code § 3937.03. This revision was submitted with respect
to Territorial base rates applying to Private Passenger Automobile Liability, Physical
Damage and Medical Payments Coverage for both the Private Passenger Automobile
Manual and the Special Package Automobile Policy Supplement. The filings indicated
that this revision of rates would produce an overall percentage change for the State
of Ohio which would represent a reduction of 9.6% (statewide average). The
statewide average reduction for the Family Automobile Policy would amount to
8.6%. Finally, the average reduction for the Special Package Automobile Policy
would amount to 8.6%. The computation in this revision utilized 2.92 years of
projection. The proposed effective date for this revision was Jan. 1, 1973, with respect
to all policies written to become effective on or after Jan. 1, 1973.
41 All 1973 model autos must meet federal bumper standards regarding damageability
on minor impact. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 1972, at 3, col. 3.
42 "The increasing pressure to give undue weight to the latest favorable year of
experience to produce a desired competitive result, despite the lesson of history that
longer experience periods are sounder to stabilize results and markets, must be
resisted by regulator and regulated alike." The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 1972, at
3, col. 2.
43
Supra, note 40.
44 Territories are geographical areas within a state divided according to the various
risks present which are in turn reflected in the base rates for the different coverages
and their limits. Ohio is divided into twenty-three different territorial classifications.
ISO filing effective Jan. 1, 1973.
45 Order of the Ohio Dept. of Insurance served on The Insurance Services Office of
Ohio and the Ohio Bureau of Casualty Insurers Nov. 20, 1972.
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this order results in equality of premiums among policyholders within
those territories and also manifests to those who consider the department
insurer-biased the evidence that they will defend the interests of the
insurance consumer. Whether their finding of unfair discrimination was
prompted by the increasing awareness and accompanying pressures of
the consumer movement remains to be seen.
RATE COMPOSITION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Traditional automobile rate regulation has been discussed, together
with its background and its present status. The consumer sector and its
ever-increasing interest in this regulation has also been examined. But
what about the rates themselves? As they are now approved by the
insurance commissioner, do these rates actually meet the statutory and
constitutional standard of being non-discriminatory? Have these rates
ever been free from discrimination? While race and ethnic background
are not variables in rate composition, geographical location is. Could not
such a variable as neighborhood location indirectly result in race or
ethnic discrimination? What about some of the other classifications that
go into rate make-up? sex? marital status? Should any of these classifications be questioned under old or new equal protection standards?
The idea of discrimination in automobile insurance rates is not
new. In June of 1968, the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
opened hearings on the automobile insurance industry.4 In those hearings
the New York City Human Rights Commissioner charged discrimination
against low-income and minority groups in the ghettos. He said this action
is very subtle, sophisticated and accepted. He pointed out that refusals to
insure Negroes and Puerto Ricans in New York are based on geographical
47
locales, rather than on the pure basis of race. In a stronger attack, the
office of Rural Legal
California,
Rosa,
Santa
the
directing attorney of
Assistance, charged that the industry is guilty of widespread discrimination
against the "little man, the brown, and the black man."
There appear to be basically two types of discrimination here. One
involves a flat refusal by a company to provide insurance coverage to a
group of people in a particular geographical area. In the other type of
discrimination, citizens in unfavorable or high risk areas are offered
insurance policies, but at a higher premium than citizens in other sections
of the community whose qualifications as to age, driving record, etc., are
identical. It is this latter type with which the discussion herein is
concerned, because it is this type of discrimination with which the

46

Hearings on S. Res. 233 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 13 (1968).
47 Id. at 7527.
48 Id. pt. 14.
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insurance department is directly involved. More specifically, it is here
submitted that automobile insurance rates using geographical locale as
one variable may be in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In addition
to geographic location, there are other classifications which have a major
impact on a policyholder's automobile rate. These include, but are not
limited to, good student discount, sex, marital status, and the distance
the vehicle is driven to work. Arguably these classifications may also
be the cause of unconstitutional private passenger automobile rates.
At the outset of this equal protection evaluation, it is imperative to
establish that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees are enforceable
against the insurance companies. The mandate of Reitman v. Mulkey9
proclaims that a state statute which authorizes or encourages discrimination significantly involves that state in private discrimination
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Ohio Revised Code section
3937.02(C) states:
Risks may be grouped by classifications for the establishment of
rates and minimum premiums....
Classifications or modifications of classifications, or any portion
or any division thereof, of risks may be predicated upon size,
expense, management, individual experience, purpose of insurance,
location or dispersion of hazard, or any other reasonable considerations, provided such classifications and modifications apply to all
risks under the same or substantially the same circumstances or
50
conditions ....
In addition to Reitman, Shelly v. Kraemer5" may be construed to hold

that state action is present when groups which practice discrimination are
licensed by the state.52 Ohio Revised Code section 3937.03 (B) 53 permits
an insurer to become a member of a licensed rating organization;
section 3937.05 deals with application for and issuance of a license
as a rating organization, and section 3937.05(A) specifies: "If the
superintendent finds that the applicant is... qualified to act as a rating
organization. . . he shall issue a license specifying the kinds of insurance
or subdivisions thereof for which the applicant may act as a rating
organization."5 Thus it is conclusive that the requisite significant state
action is present in the Ohio automobile rate situation and the Fourteenth
Amendment is available to protect the policyholder if his rights have
in fact been abrogated.
49

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
OHio REv. CODE § 3937.02(C) (Page 1971).
51 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52 Mr. Justice Douglas concurring in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385 (1967).
53 OHIo REv. CODE § 3937.03 (B) (Page 1971).
54 OHio REv. CODE § 3935.05(A) (Page 1971).
50
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In order to appreciate the value and feasibility of any equal
protection attack on insurance rates, it is important to review in capsule
form the development of equal protection and its present impact on
economic legislation. There are two different approaches or tests which
have grown up in the modern court and are used today. Historically,
however, the impact of the equal protection clause was very limited, both
in frequency of implementation and in scope of intervention. Court
interference with economic legislation usually involved substantive due
process rather than equal protection. In the 1940's the Supreme Court
began to develop its hands-off approach toward intervention in economic
55
legislation and substantive due process became history. Soon thereafter
Justice Jackson commented on the traditional equal protection test
reflecting its narrow application by saying: "Invocation of the equal
protection clause.., does not disable any governmental body from
dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition on
regulation must have a broader impact."6 This traditional equal protection
criteria condoned much legislative permissiveness. Under the old standard
the classification imposed by the state statute must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
57
did prove and
similarly circumstanced are treated alike. The old 5test
8
circumstances.
proper
the
under
still proves successful
The increasing popularity of equal protection as a widely available
substantive restraint on legislation blossomed during the Warren Court
and is partially explainable by a desire of some activist Justices such as
Justice Douglas to protect values perceived as basic without reverting
59
to the pitfalls of substantive due process. The classic decision by
Justice Douglas applying the new equal protection test is Harper v.
60
Virginia Board of Elections in which a Virginia poll tax was struck
down. The Court held that where the law involved a suspect classification
on the basis of wealth or the fundamental interest of the right to vote, any
infringement must be carefully scrutinized. The ambiguity left by Harper
as to whether a classification based on wealth could call for strict scrutiny
analysis independent of a fundamental interest was later clarified in the
61
affirmative in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners. The

55 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting

Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
56 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949).
57 F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
58 E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
59 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
61 McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
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purpose of the Harper scrutinization was defined in Kramer v. Union
Free School District No. 15.62 When legislation results in infringement of
a suspect classification or a fundamental interest, the court must scrutinize
the law to determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
63
compelling state interest.
The popularity of this new equal protection test has expanded swiftly
and significantly. In addition to suspect classifications based on race,64
wealth,6 5 and alienage, 66 the list of judicially determined fundamental
interests include the right to procreate,6 7 the right to vote,68 rights of
illegitimate children, 69 and the right to travel. 70 To date, the Burger Court
has refused to extend fundamental rights to include necessities 7 and
suspect classifications to include sex. 72 Nevertheless, the new equal
protection test is as viable as ever and inclusion of necessities and sex as
well as First Amendment rights, 73 occupation, 74 and marital status,75 are
possible future additions to this compelling interest test. Whether the
Court actually will expand new equal protection into these areas or even
into other rights or classifications not yet contemplated remains only for
educated speculation. Regardless, the door is now open for much
economic legislation to come under constitutional attack. Finally then, we
are left with a two-tier analysis: strict scrutiny where fundamental rights
or suspect classifications are involved; minimum scrutiny in other areas.
The purpose here intended is to argue that some of the classifications
involved in composition of premiums for private passenger automobiles
violate equal protection by showing no "rationality" or "compelling
interest" for the classifications. In order to facilitate demonstration of
the change in a policyholder's premium resulting from some of the
classifications used, a hypothetical insured is suggested. This insured owns

6

2 Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).

63 Id.
6
4See,

e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
66 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
67
E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
68 E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. .663 (1966).
69 E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
TOE.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
71E.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
(1971).
72 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
73
See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
65

74See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Kotch v. Board of

River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
75 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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76
a 1973 mid-priced sedan and needs coverage for normal limits. Insured
is twenty-four, single, has a clean driving record, and drives to work one
mile each way. He lives in Twinsburg, Ohio. Under these conditions his
annual premium is $446. However, if insured lived in the community of
East Cleveland, Ohio, his premium would be $590. On its face, this rather
huge inconsistency in rates does not appear too startling, at least from an
equal protection standpoint. Most assuredly, insurers can explain the rate
differential between Twinsburg, a Cleveland suburb, and East Cleveland
by their arsenal of actuarial data showing such facts as more people, cars,
thefts, and accidents in the latter community than in the former. The
theory then for justification of classifications based on geographical
locale is that people residing in an area with a higher insurance loss
ratio should be the ones to pay the price rather than policyholders
in less hazardous communities. Notwithstanding this "justification," do
geographical classifications advocate racial discrimination?

Twinsburg, Ohio is 99.2% white while 59.8% of East Cleveland is
77
composed of blacks and other races. The effectiveness of this percentage
difference is somewhat deflated, however, by the overall population of the
78
two areas: 6,432 in Twinsburg to 39,600 in East Cleveland. Perhaps a
case for racial discrimination is best exemplified by comparing East
Cleveland with Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. If insured lived in Cuyahoga Falls,
his annual premium would be $385, a difference of $205. Yet Cuyahoga
Falls is populated by 49,678 people, some 10,000 more than East
79
Cleveland, 99.8% of whom are white. Are blacks categorically more of
whites? Unfortunately, the impact
than
companies
insurance
to
a risk
of any discrimination based on race may be lessened by the showing of
white communities with rates as equally astronomical as East Cleveland.
Perhaps it is sufficient to speak in generalities. The higher insurance
premiums center in and around the large cities. Likewise the black
population centers in and around these cities. Between 1960 and 1970 the
black population inside central cities increased 20.8% while the white
80
Consequently, it is the blacks, who can
population decreased 7.8%.
generally least afford insurance, who are forced to pay higher rates for
the same protection. Notwithstanding the fact that whites in some areas
pay the same rate as blacks, the impact of the classification falls more

Injury $15,000 per person/$30,000 per occurrence; Property Damage
$10,000 per occurrence; Medical Payments $1,000 per occurrence; Full Coverage
Comprehensive; $100 Deductible Collision; Uninsured Motorist $12,500 per person/
$25,000 per occurrence. Premiums are based on the ISO filing effective Jan. 1, 1973.
76 Bodily

77/U.S.

DEPT.

OF

COMMERCE,

BUREAU

OF

THE

CENSUS,

GENERAL

POPULATION

CHARACTERISTICS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, OHio 78, 169.
78 Id.

79 Supra, note 77, at 168.
SOld. at 72.
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heavily on the blacks. The law, unequal in its application, is enough
to condemn it as incompatible with any fair conception of equal
protection of the laws.81 If racial discrimination is the case, then,
classifications based on geographical locale are susceptible to strict
scrutiny equal protection standards.
In addition to geographical classifications advocating racial discrimination, what about unequal treatment based on wealth? As previously
noted, wealth, like race, is a suspect class theoretically calling for
application of the compelling interest test.82 Using the same geographical
classifications as above, equal protection is violated based on economic
status as well as race. The 1969 median income of families and unrelated
individuals was $12,095 in Twinsburg, Ohio while the median earnings
for East Cleveland males sixteen years of age and over in the experienced
civilian labor force was only $7,595.83 Clearly, at least when using
Twinsburg and East Cleveland, the economically disadvantaged or
"poorer" policyholder is forced to pay a higher price for the same
insurance coverages as a policyholder in a wealthier community. It may
be argued, of course, that a resident of such an underprivileged area is
free to move to another community to escape this equal protection
violation. Practically, however, it is that resident's economic wealth which
freezes him in his neighborhood to exist with the surrounding consequence without redress. Notwithstanding the arguable weight of this equal
protection attack based on wealth as a suspect class, the application of
the compelling interest test is at least by definition proper.
It must be noted that the successfulness of this "wealth" argument is
very doubtful at the present time based on recent Supreme Court
decisions. The Court has been disappointing in consistently refusing to
apply their strict scrutiny based on wealth as a suspect class in cases
involving bankruptcy filing fees84 and "good time" for criminal
defendants.8 5 But the most astonishing and detrimental example of the
Burger Court's avoidance of the "wealth" class was seen in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez86 where the Court upheld the
Texas school financing system which is largely dependent on local
property taxes. In upholding this system, similar to that used in almost
all of the states, Mr. Justice Powell ignored "wealth" and held that
education is not a fundamental right. Unfortunately, it appears that the

8-Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
82 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
83 U.S.

DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL SOCIAL
EcONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, OHIO 662, 748.

AND

U.S. v. Kras, 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973).
5 McGinnis v. Royster, 41 U.S.L.W. 4259 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1973).
w 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1973).
84
8
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feasibility of using wealth as a suspect class is non-existent under the present make-up of the Court. Fortunately, however, history has proven the
flexibility of the Court with respect to reversing their prior rulings.
Another classification, relatively new in the auto insurance industry,
is known as the "good student discount." This classification would seem
to induce youthful drivers to strive for high grades in school to reap
approximately a 15% deduction on their auto insurance premiums.
Insured's premium would only be $414 instead of $446. Undoubtedly,
"A" students must have a somewhat better driving record than "C"
students or this discount would not exist. Yet, this classification seems
totally unreasonable and arbitrary. This division of students into "good"
and "not good" is a clear example of insurance companies revoking the
basic idea of risk spreading. Under the rationality test, the classification
must have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
87
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. This good
student class emasculates the phrase "similarly circumstanced." If
"good students" is such a rational classification it appears any class could
be a rational one merely by showing they have a better driving record.
Why not give a discount to people who attend church on Sunday?
Actuaries could probably find that religious people have better records
than the non-religious.
Furthermore, from a speculator's viewpoint, the degree of overa8
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness must be great. One's driving record
can only be related to his grades in school through sheer coincidence. A
reward for superior grades in school which is what this classification
presents, lacks not only a fair and substantial relation to the object of
insurance legislation; it lacks any relation whatsoever. It is a class within
a class, repugnant to any purpose of risk spreading and in violation of
traditional equal protection standards.
A classification of which auto owners often lack cognizance involves
the distance the automobile is driven to work. If insured drove four miles
to work every day instead of one or two, his premium would be $479, an
increase of $33. This classification of drivers is readily susceptible to the
traditional attack as involving excessive over-inclusion and underinclusion. Pragmatically, this class is based on the number of miles the car
is driven. The longer the auto is on the road, the greater the chance for it
to be involved in some type of liability to the insurer. But on the other
hand, if an automobile is classified for "pleasure" use, the total mileage
actually driven is irrelevant. Accordingly, a "pleasure" driver could
operate his vehicle all day every day and pay a lower premium than the
U.S. at 415.
88 For the classic study of the traditional equal protection standards see Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIW. L. REv. 341 (1949).

87253
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working man who only drives eight or ten miles per day. If there
is a rationality for the "drive to work" class, it seems to be defeated
by its application, thereby making the classification unreasonable and
incompatible with equal protection standards.
Since the "pleasure" drivers can put more mileage on their
automobiles at a lower premium, doesn't this adversely affect working
men, who drive more than several miles to work, in another way? What
about the right to pursue a particular occupation?89 Undoubtedly, this
"drive to work" classification would not be likely to cause one to refrain
from engaging in a particular job. However, total deprivation of the right
is not required. Under the new equal protection test, classifications which
might invade or restrain a fundamental interest must be closely scrutinized
and carefuly confined.90 In other words, any infringement of the right
makes the test applicable. Does not this increased premium for those
who drive to work over a specific distance infringe on their right to
employment? Is not this a penalty related to employment? Notwithstanding the infringement, the viability of a new equal protection argument
hinges on the recognition of occupation as a "fundamental interest."
Although this interest has yet to be officially deemed "fundamental" by
the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro v. Thompson91
talks about "statutory classifications affecting such 'fundamental' matters
as the right to pursue a particular occupation,"9 2 indicating that this right
might be added to the list thereby making the "drive to work"
classification amenable to the "compelling interest" standard.
A major factor involved in a policyholder's premium, at least if he
is under 30, is his marital status. For example, our insured being single
pays $446 annually. But if he were married, his premium would only
be $264. Like all the classifications for automobile insurance, overinclusiveness and under-inclusiveness based on driving records and the
degeneration of risk spreading appear to be tenable arguments regarding
the traditional equal protection standards. In addition, however, a strict
scrutiny attack based on "marital status" as a suspect class could be
successful. The major argument, of course, involves "marital status" as
a suspect class.
The suspect classification aspect of the new equal protection test is
seen as being very elastic, where every loser in the legislative process
is by definition a minority, and at least potentially classifiable as

89

See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

90 383 U.S. 663.

91394 U.S. at 661.
Id.

92
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disadvantaged.93 In the automobile insurance situation it is not marriage
that is being infringed upon. Rather, the single person is the disadvantaged
object of this classification. Recently, the Supreme Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute in Eisenstadt v. Baird94 which also set up single
persons as the disadvantaged group. The statutory scheme permitted,
inter alia, married persons to obtain contraceptives under certain
conditions to prevent pregnancy, but prohibited single persons from
doing the same. Although this decision was based on the right of
privacy, the Court made several references to marital status. Justice
Brennan at one point said, "Whatever the rights of the individual... may
be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married
alike." 95 Indeed, Eisenstadt involved a basic right of all individuals.
Nevertheless, the Court seemed to say that whatever the right, regardless
of importance, it must be the same irrespective of marital status.
Ultimately, if "marital status" can be recognized as "suspect," insurers
may find the "compelling interest" requirements impossible to meet.
Finally, the classification used by insurers based on sex is a major
variant in the policyholder's auto insurance premium. Insured's premium
is $446. Remarkably, however, if insured were a woman, the premium
would be $221 annually, less than one-half the original cost! Here the
key seems to be the acceptance of sex as a suspect class thereby
subjecting this rate classification to strict scrutinization.
In a recent sex discrimination case, Reed v. Reed,98 the Supreme
Court turned down the opportunity to rule on sex as a suspect class;
instead striking down the statute on the traditional "rationality" standard.
It is submitted, however, that it will be just a matter of time before sex is
added to the suspect class list.97 In Alexander v. Louisiana,98 Justice
Douglas in a separate opinion said, "Classifications based on sex are no
longer insulated from judicial scrutiny by a legislative judgment that
'woman's place is in the home' or that woman is by her 'nature' in-suited
for a particular task." 99 Accordingly, the current trend of women leaving
the home for outside careers and activities defeats the antiquated concept
that a female only drives to the grocery, thereby being a lesser risk to the
insurer. Clearly, the campaign to end sex discrimination is motivated by
anti-female laws. Nevertheless, sex as a suspect class would apply equally

93

Karst, Invidious Discrimination;Justice Douglas and the Return of the "NaturalLaw-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716, 742-743 (1969).
94405 U.S. 438 (1972).
9ld. at 453.
9 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
9

7 Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, as Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971).

98 Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
99 1& at 641.
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to infringements on the male, such as the one presented in the auto
insurance situation. Perhaps the adoption of the 27th Amendment to the
Constitution will be the decisive factor in making the compelling interest
standard applicable to classifications based on sex. In applying that
standard, the classifications based on sex, marital status, distance to
work, and geographical locale must be carefully tailored to the asserted
purposes and if there are other reasonable ways to achieve those goals
with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected classes, the state may
not choose the way of greater interference. 1' 0

100 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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CONCLUSION
The arguments that various classifications involved in constructing
private passenger automobile rates may be resulting in unconstitutional
rates are of course only proposals. Whether any of these categories would
in fact fail to comply with the traditional or the compelling interest equal
protection standard under the adjudicative process cannot be known until
actually put to the test. It is conceded that the Burger Court's record thus
far indicates the new Justices are disinclined to add to the list of
fundamental interests unearthed by their predecessors. 101 But time on the
bench may change attitudes as to what is basic and priorities as to what
interests must be preserved over others. Nevertheless, even if the present
Court becomes less interventionist, equal protection will still be the
preferred ground for constitutional arguments.
Tougher rate regulatory legislation, stricter enforcement by the
Department of Insurance, and subjection of rates to strict or at least
minimal scrutiny are all brought together by a common force: consumerism. It seems the importance and the desirability for these things depends
upon the basic function of insurance. Is it a luxury? Is it private industry?
Or has it developed into a public necessity? Perhaps insurance has become
such a major part of our financial lives that the social responsibilities
of the insurance companies for the consumer have outgrown and displaced
the industry's own interests and rights for financial gain. Classifications,
like those discussed, have clearly resulted in an erosion of the fundamental
concept of spreading the risk. Accordingly, the role of social equality has
not been pursued enough in insurance. Legislation, the Department of
Insurance, and the equal protection tests are merely tools. They are
tools the consumers can use to achieve the true scope of social equity
which insurance should possess.
While the legislature and the Insurance Department are relatively
old and established means of rate-watching, they have not been used to
their fullest scope. Equal protection on the other hand is a new tool, whose
potentiality is great with capabilities for effectiveness yet untapped.
JAMES J.

McGRAw

1OGunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court; A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 12 (1972).
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